The Court of Justice of the European Union on 10 July 2025 handed down its judgment in Case C-365/24, Purefun Group AB v Doggy AB, following a reference for a preliminary ruling from the Patent and Market Court of Appeal (Patent- och marknadsöverdomstolen), sitting within the Svea Court of Appeal (Svea hovrätt) in Stockholm, Sweden.
The Court held that Article 34 TFEU, Article 36 TFEU, and the Trade Mark Directive does not preclude a national legal system, such as Sweden’s, that grants exclusive rights to trade names (i.e., company names), allowing their proprietors to prohibit third parties from using identical or similar signs for similar goods or services. The Court clarified that the Trade Marks Directive does not harmonise rules on trade names, and that such rights may be protected under national laws of individual EU Member States, provided certain conditions are met. These include the requirement that the company’s activities be described with sufficient precision, and that the exclusive right may be revoked for non-use under certain conditions. The Court found that such a system, aimed at protecting industrial and commercial property, is compatible with EU law, so long as it does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that legitimate objective.
Background and Facts
Doggy AB (‘Doggy’), a Swedish company, is the registered proprietor of the company name ‘Doggy AB’ and the word mark DOGGY, registered for animal food products. Purefun Group AB (‘Purefun’), also a Swedish company, operates an online retail business selling dog food and treats under the domain name doggie.se, using the sign DOGGIE in its commercial activities.
In November 2021, Doggy initiated legal proceedings against Purefun, alleging infringement of its trade mark and trade name rights. Doggy sought an injunction to prevent Purefun from using the sign ‘DOGGIE’ and claimed damages of 150,000 SEK (€13,000, approx.). At first instance before the Patent and Market Court (Patent- och marknadsdomstolen) within the Stockholm District Court (Stockholms tingsrätt), the national court ruled in favour of Doggy, finding a likelihood of confusion between the signs.
Purefun appealed to the Patent and Market Court of Appeal (Patent- och marknadsöverdomstolen), sitting within the Svea Court of Appeal (Svea hovrätt). The appellate court raised concerns about the compatibility of the national law in Sweden with both EU primary law, Article 34 TFEU on non-fiscal measures related to the free movement of goods, and potential grounds of exception under Article 36 TFEU; and the Trade Marks Directive (Directive 2015/2436).
National law in Sweden grants company names a level of protection similar to trade marks, allowing undertakings to prohibit third parties from using similar signs for similar goods or services. However, unlike trade marks, company names are not subject to revocation for non-use, and their scope is defined more broadly by an undertaking’s stated activities, rather than a precise classification of goods or services.
The appelate court decided to make a request for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU on whether this ‘cross-protection’ of company names under national law was compatible with both EU primary law, and EU secondary law. The referring national was concerned that national law in Sweden granted company names protection equivalent to trade marks, but without imposing equivalent obligations, such as genuine use (trade marks must be used within five years or risk revocation, under which national law in Sweden does not impose a similar requirement for company names), and scope of protection (rade marks are registered for specific classes of goods/services under the Nice Classification, and that company names are protected based on the broadly defined ‘object’ of the undertaking).
Judgment of the Court
The Court began with EU secondary law by clarifying that the Trade Marks Directive aims to approximate the laws of Member States relating to trade marks, and not company names or trade names. Therefore, the Court interpreted the Trade Marks Directive as not harmonising law on company names. Without such harmonisation, national law was able to regulate such matters.
However, the Court acknowledged that trade names are not entirely outside the scope of EU law. Article 8 of the Paris Convention, incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement (to which the EU is a party), requires protection of trade names without the need for registration. This principle is reflected in recital 41 of the Trade Marks Directive, which emphasises consistency with international obligations.
Next, the Court reaffirmed the principle of the primacy of prior exclusive rights. Article 10(3)(d) of the Trade Marks Directive allows undertakings with trade marks to prohibit the use of their mark as a company name. Conversely, Article 5(4)(a) of the Trade Marks Directive permits Member States to refuse or invalidate a trade mark if it conflicts with an earlier right, such as a trade name.
The Court noted in the present case that this did not involve a conflict between a trade mark and the name of an undertaking, but rather, between two trade names: ‘Doggy’ and ‘Doggie’. As such, the Trade Marks Directive was not directly applicable to the underlying dispute. Instead therefore, the compatibility of national law had to be assessed under EU primary law, namely, the provisions concerning the free movement of goods.
On the basis of Article 34 TFEU (which prohibits quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect between Member States), the Court acknowledged that national measures preventing an undertaking from using a trade name in one EU Member State, that it uses in another EU Member States, could restrict the free movement of goods.
However, such restrictions may be justified under Article 36 TFEU, which allows derogations for the protection of industrial and commercial property (including trade names). The Court cited its earlier case law to support the view that protecting trade names against confusion a potential ground of justification.
The issue was therefore one of proportionality: whether the national system in place in Sweden went beyond what is necessary to achieve the legitimate aim of protecting trade names.
The Court stated that the absence of harmonisation in trade names means that EU Member States are not required to impose the same conditions on trade names as on trade marks. This was, for the Court, the functions of trade marks and trade names differ, in that trade marks serve to distinguish goods/services in commerce, while trade names identify the business entity itself. The requirement under national law in Sweden, that the object of the company be described with sufficient precision, ensured that third parties are adequately informed of the scope of protection.
The Court therefore concluded that the national law in Sweden, as it was in the case referred to it, did not infringe EU law, provided that:
- The exclusive right conferred by a trade name allows its proprietor to prohibit third parties from using identical or similar signs for goods/services that are identical or similar to those covered by the company’s registered activities.
- The system included provisions under which failure to use the trade name may lead to revocation of the exclusive right.
- The proprietor is required to describe and limit the nature of the company’s activities with sufficient precision to inform third parties.
Read the judgment
The judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-365/24, Purefun Group AB v Doggy AB, delivered on 10 July 2025, referred to it by the Patent and Market Court of Appeal (Patent- och marknadsöverdomstolen), sitting within the Svea Court of Appeal (Svea hovrätt), Sweden, can be read here.